Abstract. In August 2012, the Stribog hash function was selected as the new Russian hash standard (GOST R 34.11-2012). Stribog is an AES-based primitive and is considered as an asymmetric reply to the new SHA-3. In this paper we investigate the collision resistance of the Stribog compression function and its internal cipher. Specifically, we present a message differential path for the internal block cipher that allows us to efficiently obtain a 5-round free-start collision and a 7.75 free-start near collision for the internal cipher with complexities 2 8 and 2 40 , respectively. Finally, the compression function is analyzed and a 7.75 round semi free-start collision, 8.75 and 9.75 round semi free-start near collisions are presented along with an example for 4.75 round 49 out of 64 bytes near colliding message pair.
Introduction
Wang et al. attacks on MD5 [18] and SHA-1 [17] followed by the SHA-3 competition [3] have led to a flurry in the area of hash function cryptanalysis where different design concepts and various attack strategies were introduced. Many of the proposed attacks were not only targeting basic properties but they also studied any non-ideal behaviour of the hash function, compression function, internal cipher, or the used domain extender.
Stribog [1] is proposed by Grebnev et al. and has an output length of 512/256-bit. The compression function employs a 12-round AES-like cipher with 8 × 8-byte internal state preceded with one round of nonlinear whitening of the chaining value. The compression function operates in Miyaguchi-Preneel mode and is plugged in Merkle-Damgård domain extender with a finalization step. Stribog officially replaces the previous standard GOST R 34.11-94 which has been theoretically broken in [11] and recently in [9] .
The rebound attack is a differential attack [12] proposed by Mendel et al. during the SHA-3 competition to construct differential paths for AES-based hash functions. Previous literature related to the rebound attack includes Mendel et al. first proposal on the ISO standard Whirlpool and the SHA-3 finalist Grøstl [12, 13] . In particular, Mendel et al. presented a 4.5-round collision, 5.5-round semi free-start collision and 7.5-round near collision attacks on the Whirlpool compression function. As for Grøstl-256, a 6-round semi free-start collision is given.
Subsequently, rebound attacks have been applied to other AES-based hash functions such as LANE [8] , JH [14] , and Echo [5] . Various tweaks have been applied to the basic rebound attack in order to construct differential paths that cover more rounds such as merging multiple in-bounds [7] , super Sbox cryptanalysis [4] , extended 5-round inbound [7] , and linearized match-in-the-middle and start-fromthe-middle techniques [10] . Lastly, Sasaki et al. [15] presented a free-start collision and near collision attacks on Whirlpool by inserting difference in the intermediate keys to cancel the difference propagation in the message and thus creating local collisions every 4 rounds.
In this work, we investigate the security of the Stribog hash function, assessing its resistance to rebound attacks. We efficiently produce free-start collision and near collision for the internal cipher (E) reduced to 5 and 7.75 rounds by employing the concept of local collisions. Specifically, we present a message differential path such that a local collision is enforced every 2 rounds. Thus we bypass the complexity of the rebound matching in the message in-bounds by using the same differentials as in the key path. Consequently, in contrast to [15] , finding one key satisfying the key path is practically sufficient for finding a message pair following the message path. Finally, we present a practical 4.75 round 49 (out of 64) bytes near colliding message pair for the compression function and show that it is vulnerable to semi free-start 7.75 round collision, 8.75 and 9.75 round near collision attacks. Examples for the internal cipher attacks and the 4.75 round compression function nearcollision attack are provided to validate our results. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the specification of the Stribog hash function along with the notation used throughout the paper are provided. A brief overview of the rebound attack is given in Section 3. Afterwards, in Sections 4 and 5, we provide detailed description of our attacks, differential patterns, and the complexities of the attacks. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.
Specification of Stribog
Stribog outputs a 512 or 256-bit hash value and can process up to 2 512 -bit message. The compression function iterates over 12 rounds of an AES-like cipher with an 8 × 8 byte internal state and a final round of key mixing. The compression function operates in Miyaguchi-Preneel mode and is plugged in Merkle-Damgård domain extender with a finalization step. The input message M is padded into a multiple of 512 bits by appending one followed by zeros. Given M = m n .. m 1 m 0 , the compression function g N is fed with three inputs: the chaining value h i−1 , a message block m i−1 , and the block size counter N i−1 = 512 × i. (see Figure 1) . Let h i be a 512-bit chaining variable. The first state is loaded with the initial value IV and assigned to h 0 . The hash value of M is computed as follows:
where h(M) is the hash value of M. As depicted in Figure 1 , the compression function g N consists of:
-K N : a nonlinear whitening round of the chaining value. It takes a 512-bit chaining variable h i−1 and the block size counter N i−1 and outputs a 512-bit key K. -E: an AES-based cipher that iterates over the message for 12 rounds in addition to a finalization key mixing round. The cipher E takes a 512-bit key K and a 512-bit message block m as a plaintext. As shown in Figure 2 , it consists of two similar parallel flows for the state update and the key scheduling. Initially, state K is loaded with the chaining value h i−1 and updated by K N as follows:
Now K contains the key k 0 to be used by the cipher E. The message state M is initially loaded with the message block m and E(k 0 , m) runs the key scheduling function on state K to generate 12 round keys k 1 , k 2 , .., k 12 as follows:
where C i−1 is the i th round constant. The state M is updated as follows:
The final round output is given by Figure 1 . For further details, the reader is referred to [1] .
Notation
Let M and K be (8 × 8)-byte states denoting the message and key state, respectively. The following notation will be used throughout the paper:
The message state at the beginning of round i.
The message state after the U transformation at round i, where U ∈ {X, S, P, L}. Same notation applies to K.
The rebound attack
The rebound attack [12] is proposed by Mendel et al. for the cryptanalysis of AES-based hash functions. It is a differential attack that follows the inside-out or start from the middle approach which is used in the boomerang attack [16] . The rebound attack is composed of three phases, one inbound and two outbounds. The compression function, internal block cipher or permutation of a hash function is divided into three parts. If C is a block cipher, then C is expressed as C = C f w • C in • C bw . The middle part is the inbound phase and the forward and backward parts are the two outbound phases. In the inbound phase, a low probability XOR differential path is used and all possible degrees of freedom are used to satisfy the inbound path. In the two outbound phases, high probability truncated paths [6] are used. In other words, one starts from the middle satisfying C in , then hash forward and backward to satisfy C f w and C bw probabilistically. For an 8 × 8 byte state, the basic rebound attack finds two states satisfying an inbound phase over two rounds 8
−→ 8. The main idea is to pick random differences at each of the two eight active bytes sates. Then propagate both backward and forward until the output and input of the full active state Sbox, respectively. Using the Sbox differential distribution table (DDT), find values that satisfy input and output differentials. This process is further illustrated in Figure 3 . The last step of the attack is called the Sbox matching phase and its complexity depends on the Sbox DDT. If the probability of differentials that have solutions is p, then the matching probability is given by p 8 .
In the following, we analyze the Sbox used in Stribog and investigate how it affects the complexity of the rebound attack. The Stribog Sbox DDT has the following properties:
-Out of the 65536 differentials, there are 27300 possible non trivial differentials, i.e., nonzero (input, output) difference pairs that have solutions. Thus the probability that a randomly chosen differential is possible ≈ 0.42 = 2
-Each possible differential can have 2, 4, 6, or 8 solutions.
-A given input difference has a minimum of 98 and a maximum of 114 output differences. -A given output difference has a minimum of 90 and a maximum of 128 input differences. -For a given input (output) difference the average number of output (input) difference is 107.
From the analysis of the Sbox DDT, one can estimate the complexity of the inbound matching part of the rebound attack. Let us consider the basic inbound path 8 One can repeat step (4.a) at most 2 8 times since we variate only one byte. However, the success probability of step 4.b. (finding solutions for the whole active row) is 2 −1.3×8 ≈ 2 −10 which cannot be easily satisfied by randomizing one byte difference. One would often have to restart at step 2, i.e., pick another output difference. The same situation takes place when we move to the next row and pick a new output difference. In this case we have to start from row 0. As a result, the complexity of finding solutions to the 8 rows is not purely added [12] . Based on our experimental results, the complexity of this inbound path is in the order of 2 18 . However finding this match means finding at least 2 64 actual state values for M 64 values is a new starting point to satisfy the two outbound paths. In the following section, we present our attack on the internal block cipher of the Stribog compression function.
Attacks on the internal block cipher (E)
Verifying the ideal behaviour of the internal primitives of a hash function is important to evaluate its resistance to distinguishing attacks [2] . In this section we investigate the internal block cipher (E) and, by employing the idea of successive local collisions, we present a message differential path that collides every two rounds. This message differential path enables us to efficiently produce 5-round semi free-start collision and 7.75-round 40 bytes (out of 64) semi free-start near collision. The main idea of our approach is to first find a pair of keys that follows a given differential path and then use it to search for a pair of messages satisfying the message path. The approach of creating local collisions works perfectly if the key and the message flows are identical and the initial key is the input chaining value. To this end, one can keep similar differential patterns and the state message difference is cancelled after the X transformation. However, in the compression function of Stribog the key used in the internal cipher is the result of applying the K N transformation on the input chaining value. Similar differential patterns can be obtained when considering the internal block cipher. In our attack on the Stribog internal cipher, we present a message differential path such that a local collision is enforced every two rounds. Specifically, we first search for a pair of keys that satisfies the key differential path, then we use the Sbox differentials in the key path for the message path. Consequently, we bypass the complexity caused by the Sbox DDT matching in the message differential path and only one key pair is required to search for a message pair. In [15] , Sasaki et al. presented a message differential path that creates local collisions every four rounds for the Whirlpool compression function and reported that they had to try 109 key pairs to search for a message pair that collides every 4 round. Furthermore, they estimated an increase in the message search complexity by a factor of 2 7 and attributed this to the imbalance of the Sbox DDT. Given the Stribog Sbox DDT, finding one key pair that follows the 8-round differential path takes up to two hours on an 8-core Intel i7 CPU running at 2.67GHz. Accordingly, it is important that the message differential path requires only one key pair to be satisfied. In what follows, we give the details of our approach. 
5-round free-start collision
Since the Stribog's Sbox DDT is biased with possible differential probability ≈ 0.42, we bypass the Sbox matching phase by using a message differential path such that local collisions are created every two rounds. The used key and message paths are given by:
Key: 64 This message differential path allows us to bypass the rebound matching part completely in our message search because the same input and output Sbox differences in the key path are used for the message path. Thus the matching probability is 1. Unlike the differential paths in [15] , our message differential path is satisfied practically using only one key pair. In this attack, we do not use the matching part of the rebound attack in either the key or the message; we only search for one byte value in the message to find a common solution between two rounds which can be considered as a meet in the middle approach. As depicted in Figure 4 , the steps for finding a key pair can be summarized as follows:
1. Choose a random difference and a random value for byte K , respectively. Having the same differences in the message states as in the key states implies that no differential matching is needed at the Sboxes of rounds 2 and 4, and guarantees that the differences in K 3 and M 3 cancel out. Similar observation applies to K 5 and M 5 .
To search for a conforming message pair, we need to find a common solution between the Sboxes of rounds 2 and 4 possible solutions. This can be achieved as follows. Since M [3, 3] (the intersection of the two ellipses in Figure 4) , we compare byte [3, 3] of each backward result against byte [3, 3] from each entry in list L. The success probability for finding a one byte match is 2 −8 which can be easily fulfilled by the number of entries in L. Once a match is found, we assign the matching list row to M 
8-round collision and 7.75-round near collision attacks
Extending the 5 round path to 8 rounds adds complexity to the key search part because we need to use an improved version of the rebound attack to get a key pair following a longer differential path. We employ the following message and key differential paths:
Key: 64 and use the start form the middle technique [10] to solve the key inbound phase between rounds 3 and 5. This approach finds states following a 1 −→ 8 −→ 64 −→ 8 transition. Unlike the basic inbound that yields 2 64 solutions, using this approach on Stribog results in only one solution. For AES Sboxes, a solution is expected in a time complexity of 2 8 and memory complexity of 2 8 . However, for Stribog's biased Sbox DDT, one practical solution is found between 33 minutes to 2 hours on an 8-core Intel i7 CPU running at 2.67GHz. Accordingly, it is crucial that the key outbound phase has high probability if one is aiming for practical results and no rebound matching is used in the message search so that one key is enough to get a conforming message pair. In the following steps, we briefly describe the procedure we used for solving the 1 −→ 8 −→ 64 −→ 8 key inbound phase. Figure 5 further illustrates the process. Finally, by hashing the obtained key pair two rounds backward and two rounds forward, we get a conforming key pair that follows the key differential path. Once we have the key, we can directly get a message pair in the same way as explained in the previous section for the 5-round collision. This message pair satisfies the message differential path up until M L 6 . However, to have an 8-round collision, we need the difference in K 8 to cancel the difference in M 8 after the X transformation in round 8. Since both L and P transformations are linear, then this condition is satisfied if the 8 byte differences in K Figure 4 , the implemented 7.75-round differential pattern, with 2 40 time and 2 8 state memory complexities is given. Table 2 shows an example for a free-start 5-round collision and 7.75-round near collision for the internal cipher (E). Both the 5-round semi free-start collision and the 7.75 semi free-start near collision are demonstrated by one example because the 7.75 semi free-start near collision path collides at round 5.
Attacks on Stribog compression function
As depicted in Figure 1 , the compression function of Stribog employs a nonlinear whitening round K N of the chaining value. This extra round randomizes the chaining value before being introduced as a key for the block cipher E. As long as there is no difference in the chaining value, most of the differential trails proposed for Whirlpool are also applicable on the Stribog compression function.
In what follows, we consider semi free-start collision attacks on the compression function. Several approaches are used to extend the inbound phase can be used to construct collision paths for the compression function. The extended 5 round inbound presented in [7] finds a pair of states satisfying the 8 7.75 round semi free-start collision. This is obtained by using two outbounds in the form of 8 −→ 1. The probability of a transition from 8 active bytes to 1 active byte through L is 2 −8×7 = 2 −56 . Given the following path:
−→ 64
one can produce a semi free-start collision. We need two transitions from 8 to 1 in both the forward and backward directions, and the one active byte in the first and last states to be equal so that they cancel out after the feedforward. Thus, one needs to try 2 56+56+8 times to satisfy the outbound phase. In other words, we need 2 120 inbound solutions. If the complexity of one inbound solution is 2 64 , then the time complexity of 7.75 rounds semi free-start collision is 2 184 and the memory complexity is 2 8 , as we can pass one active byte through X, S and P transformations with probability one.
7.75 round semi free-start near collision. While aiming for collision requires both differences in the first and last states to be exactly in the same place so that they cancel out after the feedforward, near collision requires only few differences to cancel out. A 49-byte near collision is obtained by extending the 5-round inbound with two transitions from 8 to 8 in both directions with no additional cost. Using the following path: Figure 6 . A 4.75-round near colliding pair is given in Table 1 using the IV = 0 and N = 0. −→ 64
The probability that one active byte is cancelled by the feedforward is 2 −8 . Consequently the complexity of 8.75 rounds semi free-start 49-byte collision is 2 64+56+8 = 2 120 .
9.75 round semi free-start near collision. With a complexity of 2 196 , a 9.75-round 49-byte near collision can be obtained with a lower complexity of 2 184 . By adding two 8 to 1 transitions in both the forward and the backward directions for a complexity of 2 112 and two 1 to 8 transitions in rounds one (backward) and nine (forward) for no additional cost, the following path: 
Conclusion
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